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ABSTRACT
Participants in the hospital peer review process enjoy enormous protections under federal
and state law. We contend that these protections—immunity, evidentiary privilege, and
confidentiality—impede quality improvement in health care. As a result of these protections, the
current peer review system produces both improper severity and improper leniency. We propose
to reform the system by eliminating all federal and state statutory protections for the peer review
process. A public process that is open to review and open to challenge by all interested parties
will better promote health-care quality.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Participants in the hospital peer review process enjoy enormous protections under federal
and state law. The federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) provides
qualified immunity to hospitals and members of peer review committees for “professional review
action[s]” that may result in the loss of a doctor’s clinical privileges.1 The great majority of states
have statutes that likewise provide some degree of peer review immunity.2 The great majority of
states also make peer review proceedings privileged—inadmissible in evidence and protected
from discovery—and mandate that peer review proceedings be kept confidential.
In addition to providing immunity to participants in the peer review process, the HCQIA
established a National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).3 Hospitals must report to the NPDB
when they take certain actions against doctors, such as revoking their clinical privileges.4
In this article, we argue that the federal and state protections lavished on the peer review
process are inimical to that process, impede full and effective disclosure to the NPDB, and
impede quality improvement in health care. The quality assurance function of the peer review
*
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1
See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2012).
2
See infra Appendix.
3
See 45 U.S.C. § 11134; 42 U.S.C. § 11133; 42 U.S.C § 11134 (2012).
4
45 U.S.C. § 11134(a). "The information required to be reported under sections 11131, 11132(a), and 11133 of this
title shall be reported regularly (but not less often than monthly) and in such form and manner as the Secretary
prescribes.”
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system is undermined by two kinds of errors: improper severity and improper leniency.5
Improper severity occurs when doctors are wrongly disciplined or wrongly denied clinical
privileges for which they have applied.6 Further, when these improperly severe disciplinary
measures are reported to the NPDB, such reports can seriously damage a physician’s ability to
practice medicine, as employers and health insurance companies may be reluctant to hire or
utilize practitioners with such adverse reports.7
Improper leniency occurs in a number of ways.8 A peer review committee may wrongly
exonerate a doctor. A credentialing committee may wrongly allow doctors to obtain or retain
credentials. A peer review committee may fail to be convened, even in the face of apparent doctor
misconduct and/or bad patient outcome. And hospitals may evade or violate the NPDB reporting
requirements. Indeed, according to one study, the only measure that has affected the amount of
adverse peer review action reporting in a state is the imposition of “a strong penalty for failing to
report peer review actions.”9
We contend that the current federal and state regulatory system increases the likelihood
and frequency of all these errors, both the improperly severe and the improperly lenient. This
multifaceted focus sets our article apart from previous work that is generally more concerned
either with problems of improper severity10 or with problems of improper leniency. 11 One major
element of the current system that predisposes it to error is the use of internal, self-interested
reviewers. The second element is the array of federal and state legal protections for peer review
that throw a blanket of secrecy and immunity over the process, preventing scrutiny and thwarting
legitimate challenges. Putting these elements together, we end up with legal incentives for both
improper severity and improper leniency.
In Part I of this Essay, we give an overview of the hospital peer review process and the
federal and state statutes that protect it. In Part II, we describe the problems of the current peer
review system, explaining why it tends to produce both improper severity and improper leniency.
Part II also examines the specific deficits of the current peer review process. In Part III, we propose
to reform the system by eliminating all federal and state statutory protections for the peer review
process. A public process that is open to review and open to challenge by all interested parties will
better promote quality in health care.
II.

REGULATORY BACKGROUND

Peer review in the hospital setting is the process by which doctors evaluate the
professional competence and conduct of other doctors, both on an ongoing basis and in the
context of poor patient outcome. Peer review is widely deemed one of the “pillars of quality
5

See discussion infra Parts II.B.1–2.
See infra Part II.B.1.
7
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
8
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
9
See Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit—Is It Time For a Change?, 25
AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 47 (1999).
10
See, e.g., Charles R. Koepke, Physician Peer Review Immunity: Time to Euthanize a Fatally Flawed Policy, 22
J.L. & HEALTH 1, 10–14 (2009); Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, Comment, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: How the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review Protection Statutes Have Helped Protect Bad
Faith Peer Review in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 239, 268–69 (2001).
11
See, e.g., Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 20.
6
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assurance” in healthcare.12 Hospitals are required to have a peer review system as a condition of
participation in Medicare,13 and peer review is also a requirement for accreditation by the Joint
Commission, the organization that accredits hospitals.14
This article is mainly concerned with peer review addressing the quality of care rendered
by a specific physician or for a specific patient. In such a proceeding, the members of the peer
review committee are in most cases doctors who work at the same hospital as the doctor under
review. External peer review is rare.15
Moore et al. list the three assumptions underlying the traditional practice of disciplinary
peer review.16 First, “due to their unique and specialized training, only physicians can properly
evaluate and judge other physicians’ medical practices and detect when colleagues pose a risk to
patient care.”17 Second, “a milieu supporting candid communication is most likely to foster
recognition of both exemplary and substandard care.”18 And third, “peer review participants are
motivated to maintain high standards of care in their group or institution and act in good faith.”19
The hospital credentialing process is also a peer review process. Hospitals use the
credentialing process to determine whether a physician is qualified for employment or clinical
privileges.20 A doctor cannot provide medical care at a given healthcare facility if he or she lacks
clinical privileges.21 During the credentialing process, the hospital queries the NPDB and makes
inquiries of various professional sources, seeking information such as the practitioner’s
“education and training, previous positions held, and malpractice actions and disciplinary
sanctions.”22
A.

Federal Regulation Under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA)

The HCQIA provides qualified immunity to health care entities, members of a
“professional review body,” and associated persons from damages claims arising from a

12

Troyen A. Brennan, Hospital Peer Review and Clinical Privileges Actions: To Report or Not Report, 281 JAMA
381, 381 (1999).
13
See 42 C.F.R. § 482.22 (2014).
14
Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 20; see Standards FAQ Details: Focused Professional Practice Evaluation, JOINT
COMMISSION,
http://www.jointcommission.org/mobile/standards_information/jcfaqdetails.aspx?StandardsFAQId=467&S
tandardsFAQChapterId=74 (last revised Jan. 31, 2013).
15
See Marc T. Edwards & Evan M. Benjamin, The Process of Peer Review in U.S. Hospitals, 16 J. CLINICAL
OUTCOMES MGMT. 461, 463 (2009) (noting that in survey of hospitals, “[e]xternal peer review constituted less than
1% of total review volume for 87% of hospitals and less than 5% for another 8%”).
16
See Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malpractice Claims Risk,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2006).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. We discuss later in the article the extent to which these assumptions are true under the current regulatory
scheme governing disciplinary peer review. See infra Part II.
20
Teresa M. Waters et al., The Role of the National Practitioner Data Bank in the Credentialing Process, 21 AM. J.
MED. QUALITY 30, 31 (2006).
21
Ambulatory Care Program: The Who, What, When, and Where’s of Credentialing and Privileging, The Joint
Commission Accreditation: Ambulatory Care, available at
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/AHC_who_what_when_and_where_credentialing_booklet.pdf. See also
id.; Philip L. Merkel, Physicians Policing Physicians: The Development of Medical Staff Peer Review Law at
California Hospitals, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 301, 302-303 (2004).
22
See Waters, supra note 20, at 31–32.
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“professional review action.”23 A “professional review action” is one that is “based on the
competence or professional conduct of an individual physician” and that may adversely affect
the physician’s clinical privileges.24
HCQIA immunity applies to damages claims arising under state law as well as federal
law.25 It does not apply to civil rights claims, however.26 Also, it does not bar claims for
injunctive relief.27
In order to be entitled to HCQIA immunity, a “professional review action” must meet a
number of requirements. It must be taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health
care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician
involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the
circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after
such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the requirement of
paragraph (3).28
Congress justified the HCQIA’s grant of immunity to participants in the peer review
process based on congressional findings that “[t]here is an overriding national need to provide
incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review”29 and that
the “threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including treble damage
liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in
effective professional peer review.”30
As noted in the Introduction, the other major component of the HCQIA is the
establishment of the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB or “the Data Bank”).31 A health
care entity (such as a hospital) must make a report to the NPDB if it “takes a professional review
action that adversely affects the clinical privileges of a physician for a period longer than 30
days,” if it “accepts the surrender of clinical privileges of a physician . . . while the physician is
under . . . investigation . . . [for] incompetence or improper professional conduct,” or “in return
for not conducting such an investigation or proceeding.”32 The HCQIA also requires state

23

See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2012).
Id. § 11151.
25
See id. § 11111(a)(1).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. § 11112(a).
29
Id. § 11101(5).
30
Id. § 11101(4).
31
The term “National Practitioner Data Bank” is not actually used in the HCQIA; it is found in the implementing
regulations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.1–.22 (2015).
32
See 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1) (2012); see also 45 U.S.C. § 11134(a).
24

4

Vol. 11:1]

Michael Benson

medical licensing boards to report to the NPDB when they impose sanctions on physicians,33 and
it requires insurance companies to report medical malpractice payments to the NPDB.34
If a hospital persistently fails to make its required reports to the NPDB, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services can in theory move to revoke its HCQIA immunity for the peer
review proceedings it conducts.35 However, this sanction has never been applied.36
The HCQIA requires hospitals to query the NPDB when a doctor applies for clinical
privileges at the hospital and every two years thereafter.37 Normally, doctors are re-credentialed,
or have their clinical privileges reviewed, every two years.38
To justify the NPDB requirements, the HCQIA contains a Congressional finding that
“[t]here is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to
State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous damaging or incompetent
performance.”39 Prior to the HCQIA, it was common for hospitals to quietly rid themselves of
incompetent doctors, who then found other positions, sometimes in another state. The HCQIA
attempted to fix this problem by establishing the NPDB, requiring sanctioning hospitals to report
adverse actions to the NPDB, and requiring hiring hospitals to query the NPDB before granting
or renewing clinical privileges.40
B.

The Varying Levels of State Protection: Immunity, Privilege, and Confidentiality

Most states provide additional protections to the peer review process that are not
preempted by the HCQIA.41 State statutory protection of peer review comes in three forms:
immunity, evidentiary privilege, and confidentiality. There are differences in the level and form
of protection extended.
Every state but California, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon provides some statutory
immunity to participants in the peer review process.42 Many states provide greater immunity than
the HCQIA with respect to state-law claims because they do not require the peer review process
to satisfy all the prerequisites set forth in the HCQIA.43 In Illinois, for example, participants in
the peer review process are immune from damages for all “conduct in connection with their
duties on such committees, except those involving willful or wanton misconduct.”44

33

See § 11132(a)(1); § 11133(a)(1).
See id. § 11131(a).
35
See id. § 11133(c)(1).
36
ALAN LEVINE & SIDNEY WOLFE, PUB. CITIZEN, HOSPITALS DROP THE BALL ON PHYSICIAN OVERSIGHT 8 (2009),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/18731.pdf; see also Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 37.
37
See 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a) (2012).
38
Ambulatory Care Program: The Who, What, When, and Where’s of Credentialing and Privileging, The Joint
Commission Accreditation: Ambulatory Care, available at
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/AHC_who_what_when_and_where_credentialing_booklet.pdf.
39
Id. § 11101(2).
40
See supra notes 32–33, 37 and accompanying text. Professor Van Tassel questions how common the “state
hopping” part of this problem was. See Katharine Van Tassel, Using Clinical Practice Guidelines and Knowledge
Translation Theory to Cure the Negative Impact of the Hospital Peer Review Hearing System on Healthcare
Quality, Cost, and Access, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 911, 924 (2013).
41
See 42 U.S.C. § 11115(a) (2012); infra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
42
See infra Appendix. The attached Appendix updates information presented in Scheutzow, supra note 9, at app. A.
43
See infra Appendix. See also 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).
44
225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/5 (2014).
34
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Except for New Jersey, every state and the District of Columbia have some form of
privilege for the peer review process,45 which means evidence concerning peer review
proceedings is inadmissible in court and not subject to discovery. There is no analogous federal
statutory privilege for peer review proceedings. The main significance of the state-level privilege
statutes is to prevent medical malpractice plaintiffs from using evidence generated by the peer
review process.
Finally, all but ten states protect the confidentiality of peer review information.46
“Confidentiality laws differ from privilege laws in that . . . privilege . . . appl[ies] to [the]
discoverability and admissibility of evidence as part of a judicial proceeding[, while]
confidentiality generally applies to the release of peer review information to third parties outside
of the judicial context.”47 “Only a few states[, however,] provide civil or criminal penalties for a
breach of confidentiality.”48 State privilege and confidentiality protections hold even when peer
review results are reported to the NPDB.49
III.
A.

ORIGIN AND DEFECTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

The Federal and State Legislative Intents Behind Peer Review Protections

To understand the incentives of hospitals to conduct and report peer review actions, one
must understand the intent behind peer review’s statutory protections. At the federal level,
Congress passed the HCQIA in “response to the medical malpractice crisis of its day.”50 At the
time, there was the perceived threat to “physicians and hospital administrators that they [would]
be sued” in response to a planned adverse privilege decision,51 and the Subcommittee on Health
and the Environment even received testimony indicating that the threat of these suits was having
a “chilling effect” on peer review.52 [H]ospitals and peer review committees were hesitant to
accuse physicians lest they become the target of retaliatory and costly litigation, and would
frequently accept “voluntary” resignations to avoid litigation.53 Not only that, but “state medical
boards would engage in a form of . . . plea bargaining” where they would “accept[] the
‘voluntary’ surrender of [the] physician’s license” in return for the physician ceasing to practice
in their state.54
Congress found that “[t]here is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent
physicians to move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician’s
previous damaging or incompetent performance.”55 Hence, the HCQIA requires hospitals to
45

See infra Appendix.
These states do not address the issue of confidentiality: Arkansas, California, Florida, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin. See infra Appendix.
47
Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 17.
48
Id. at 35–36.
49
GERALD N. ROGAN ET AL., HOW PEER REVIEW FAILED AT REDDING MEDICAL CENTER, WHY IT IS FAILING
ACROSS THE COUNTRY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 30 (2008), available at
http://roganconsulting.com/docs/Congressional_Report-Disaster_Analysis_RMC_6-1-08.pdf (referring to the NPDB
as “the Data Bank”).
50
Koepke, supra note 10, at 5 (internal quotation mark omitted).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 5–6.
55
42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (2012).
46
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report physicians to the NPDB under certain circumstances, chiefly in the event of an adverse
peer review outcome.56 Next, the HCQIA grants those who participate in the peer review process
immunity from damages provided that an action is taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health
care, (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts . . . , (3) after adequate notice
and hearing are afforded to the physician involved . . . , and (4) in the reasonable
belief that the action was warranted by the facts known . . . .57
The HCQIA’s legislative history indicates that Congress believed limited immunity was essential
to ensure both that physicians would participate in peer review and that hospitals would report
errant physicians to the NPDB.58
The HCQIA sought to encourage doctors to perform peer review by protecting
them from suits by disciplined physicians and treble antitrust damages.59 This reasoning
is not far removed from state peer review protection statutes, which have a variety of
similar rationales. The predominant rationale for state protections is the belief that
doctors are the most familiar with the relevant standard of care, and hence are best able to
judge their fellow physicians, but the fear of litigation discourages them from
participating.60 Therefore, physicians and legislatures conclude, the best way to
encourage peer review is to provide greater protection for it.61

56

The HCQIA provides in pertinent part:
Each health care entity which—
(A) takes a professional review action that adversely affects the clinical privileges of a
physician for a period longer than 30 days;
(B) accepts the surrender of clinical privileges of a physician—
(i) while the physician is under an investigation by the entity relating to possible
incompetence or improper professional conduct, or
(ii) in return for not conducting such an investigation or proceeding; or
(C) in the case of such an entity which is a professional society, takes a professional review
action which adversely affects the membership of a physician in the society,
shall report to the Board of Medical Examiners.

Id. § 11133(a)(1). “The term ‘adversely affecting’ includes reducing, restricting, suspending, revoking, denying, or
failing to renew clinical privileges or membership in a health care entity.” Id. § 11151(1).
57
Id. § 11112(a). For participating in the peer review process, the HCQIA protects
(A) the professional review body, (B) any person acting as a member or staff to the body, (C) any
person under a contract or other formal agreement with the body, and (D) any person who
participates with or assists the body with respect to the action . . . [from liability for] damages
under any law of the United States or of any State (or political subdivision thereof) with respect to
the action.
Id. § 11111(a)(1). This also applies to individuals providing information to the peer review body. See id.
§ 11111(a)(2).
58
H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, at 3 (1986).
59
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2012).
60
See Leigh Ann Lauth, Note, The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005: An Invitation for Sham
Peer Review in the Health Care Setting, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 151, 167 (2007).
61
See Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 17.
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Another postulated rationale is to allow an “institution to learn from its mistakes and . . .
make amends with [the] affected parties, which may . . . curb litigation.”62 The ideal outcome
would be for doctors to self-report mistakes to the peer review committee.63 Self-reporting would
“allow the peer review committee to investigate the situation, attempt to settle grievances with
the patient, and provide education to other health care providers in order to reduce the occurrence
of such mistakes in the future.”64 This enables the doctor to self-report without the “fear that this
information will be used by the hospital or the patient against him.”65
B.

Defects of the Current System

The immunity granted to the peer review process by the Healthcare Quality
Improvement Act of 1986, together with state protections of immunity, privilege, and
confidentiality, have the paradoxical effect of undermining the quality assurance function of peer
review. These protections produce both improper severity and improper leniency.
I. Improper Severity
One serious problem of the current system is bad-faith, or “sham,” peer review. Sham
peer review occurs when a physician is disciplined not because of an honest determination as to
his competence or conduct, but for some other improper motive. Evidence of this problem,
indeed, may have been present at the birth of the HCQIA. In enacting the HCQIA, Congress was
influenced by the Supreme Court’s holding in Patrick v. Burget.66 In Patrick, a doctor, Timothy
Patrick, had left a medical practice in Astoria, Oregon, and had become a competitor of the
doctors in that practice.67 Patrick’s competitors then initiated peer review proceedings against
him, and may have been able to control those proceedings.68 Rather than have his hospital
privileges revoked, Patrick resigned from the hospital with which he and his competitors were
affiliated.69 He then sued for antitrust violations and recovered treble damages.70
One conclusion observers might have drawn from Patrick is that the peer review process,
where competitors serve as both prosecutors and judges, is susceptible to considerable abuse, and
that legal remedies must be available to deter such abuse. Instead, in a triumph of public relations
for the hospital industry, Congress concluded that the entire institution of peer review was
jeopardized by suits like that in Patrick, saying “[t]he threat of private money damage liability
under Federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably
discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer review.”71
The HCQIA provides that in order to qualify for immunity, a peer review proceeding
cannot use reviewers who are “in direct economic competition with the physician involved.”72
The sham peer review that may have occurred in the Patrick case, therefore, presumably would
62

Lauth, supra note 60, at 166.
See id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
486 U.S. 94 (1988); see generally Van Tassel, supra note 40, at 919–21 (giving an excellent summary of Patrick
and discussing congressional response to it).
67
See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 96.
68
See id. at 97.
69
See id.
70
Id. at 97–98.
71
42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) (2012).
72
Id. at § 11112 (b)(3)(A)(iii).
63
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not be protected today under the HCQIA. Nevertheless, it is not always clear when a peer
reviewer can be characterized as a direct economic competitor of the physician under review.73
Direct competitors also can have influence on the peer review process even when they do not
serve as reviewers themselves, such as where hospital bylaws prevent direct competitors from
participating in a review committee or a fair hearing panel, but do not prohibit them from
participating in the peer review process in a different capacity.74
Since the adoption of the HCQIA, a considerable body of evidence has grown appearing
to demonstrate that the current federal-state regulatory scheme shields the peer review process
from challenge and scrutiny.75 Some care is needed when evaluating this evidence. There are two
sides to every case, and public accusations of sham review are often accompanied by no
comment from the hospital, or only the most vague and anodyne denial. Still, we are convinced,
from reviewing the various reports and from our own anecdotal experience, that sham peer
review is indeed a serious problem. Simple common sense dictates that if people have the motive
and ability to get rid of an unwanted coworker for illegitimate reasons, with little expectation of
being called to account, they will sometimes do so. Perhaps a worse indictment of the current
peer review process is that there is simply no way to assess the validity of peer review either for
individual cases or institution-wide.
The desire to eliminate competitors is not the only improper motive that figures in sham
peer review. The accused doctor may be the victim of a personality conflict. The internal
reviewers may be acceding to the will of hospital administrators, who have their own improper
motives. Most troubling of all, the hospital administrators and/or internal reviewers may desire to
rid themselves of a whistleblower.
There are many reported examples of hospitals using disciplinary peer review, or the
threat of peer review, to retaliate against doctors who raise questions about health care quality.
As stated in one journalistic account: “In medical centers as small as Centre Community Hospital
in State College [Pennsylvania] and as prestigious as Yale and Cornell, doctors who step forward
to warn of unsafe conditions or a colleague’s poor work say they have been targeted by hospital
administrations or boards.”76 The wide perception among doctors that whistleblowers may be
punished with sham peer review has, of course, an in terrorem effect, discouraging doctors from
challenging hospital administrators on issues of health care quality. Ironically, fear of sham peer
review or other discipline leads doctors to avoid criticizing the work of colleagues when they
believe such criticism may be unwelcome to hospital administrators: precisely the opposite of the
hoped-for effect of HCQIA immunity.
When a doctor is wrongfully deprived of hospital privileges, there is enormous social
waste. If the loss of privileges is for more than thirty days, the adverse action must be reported to
73

See, e.g., Pierson v. Orlando Health, No. 6:08-cv-466-JA-GJK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115101, at *42–46 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 27, 2010).
74
Such as being a witness for the hospital, “participat[ing] in the board meetings regarding the adverse action
against” a doctor, “participat[ing] in the board meetings during which [a doctor]’s peer review was discussed,” or
“present[ing] the executive committee's case before [a] review committee [or] the fair hearing panel.” Doe v. Delnor
Cmty. Health Sys., No. 2-10-0880, 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2418, at *43 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 29, 2011).
75
See, e.g., Koepke, supra note 10, at 6–8; William M. Johnston, Shammed I Am, in Peer Review: Due Process
Does Not Apply for Physicians Facing Sham Peer Review, GEN. SURGERY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2004),
http://www.generalsurgerynews.com/Opinions-Letters/Article/08-04/Shammed-I-Am-in-Peer-Review/3894.
Additional examples are cited in Van Tassel, supra note 40, at 954–55.
76
Steve Twedt, The Cost of Courage: How the Tables Turn on Doctors, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 26, 2003,
at A1.
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the NPDB.77 Often, such a report seriously damages a doctor’s career, as hospital employers and
health insurance companies are reluctant to have the doctor serve as a preferred provider within
their insurance networks.
To be sure, doctors who are victims of sham peer review do, in theory, have a legal
remedy. Congress provided only qualified immunity to the peer review process, not absolute
immunity. The immunity can be overcome, and a federal civil suit for damages can be
maintained, if the disciplined doctor can show that the discipline was not taken “in the
reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care,” or that one of the
other prerequisites of the HCQIA was not met.78 Some suits alleging sham peer review have
been successful even in the face of federal and state immunities. Nevertheless, these suits are
now severely hampered, and often courts give enormous deference to the peer review process—
possibly more deference than the immunity statutes intend.79 In fact, out of 133 challenges to
immunity under HCQIA by 2011, only seventeen (12.8%) were successful in vacating
immunity.80
II. Improper Leniency
i.

Peer Review Committees that are Biased in Favor of the Accused Doctor or not
Convened at all
Just as improper motivations protected by immunity and secrecy can lead hospitals and
self-interested reviewers to mete out unjustified punishment, these factors can also lead hospitals
and self-interested reviewers to withhold justified punishment and whitewash a doctor’s
misconduct. Improper motives for leniency can include personal friendships and collaborative
relationships with the accused doctor. Physician reviewers not in the same specialty as the doctor
under review may lose patient referrals from that doctor.81 Physicians in the same specialty may
also have collaborative relationships; for example, they may cross-cover for the accused doctor
to maintain hospital on-call coverage.82 Once again, internal reviewers may simply accede to the
will of hospital administrators who have their own improper motivations, this time in favor of the
accused doctor.
Peer review bodies that are disposed to improper leniency are in a way more insidious
than those that are disposed to improper severity. At least in the event of sham peer review, there
is one party—the doctor under review—who has some idea what has occurred and may be
motivated to contest the result. When a peer review body improperly exonerates the doctor, no
one may be aware that something is amiss because the process is shrouded in secrecy.
77
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Because of the shroud of secrecy, it is impossible to prove how frequently such cases
occur, but one indication of the danger can be seen in the dramatic failure of peer review in the
Redding Medical Center scandal. At Redding Medical Center in Redding, California, two
cardiac specialists, Drs. Moon and Realyvasquez, conspired to perform an enormous number of
unnecessary heart surgeries between 1992 and 2002.83 Moon, the director of cardiology,
intentionally misdiagnosed patients as needing complicated surgery and referred them to
Realyvasquez, the director of cardiac surgery.84 As a result, patients died, but the two doctors
were enriched, as was Redding Medical Center.85 The hospital administrators, along with Moon
and Realyvasquez, blocked peer review of the unnecessary surgeries, even though other doctors
at Redding raised alarms.86 If peer review were a public process, it would be difficult to get away
with such a scheme, but due to the web of federal and state protections, no one knows what
happens in the peer review process—and no one can find out.
ii. Thwarting the Negligent Credentialing Tort
Tort law provides one avenue that can potentially discourage hospitals from refusing to
conduct necessary peer review, or from whitewashing a doctor’s errors in a peer review
proceeding that is biased in favor of the accused doctor. Many states allow a tort action for
negligent credentialing.87 In those states, a doctor’s hospital privileges must be authorized and
periodically reauthorized by credentialing committees.88 If a doctor commits malpractice, the
injured plaintiff can attempt to sue not only the doctor, but also the hospital under a number of
theories. One of those theories is that the hospital negligently granted or extended hospital
privileges to the doctor.89 Such an action might also challenge the failure of the hospital to
institute peer review of the doctor’s past mistakes or claim that a peer review proceeding was
biased in favor of the doctor.90
However, the very state statutes that protect the peer review process from claims by
doctors that it was too harsh have also been used, at times, to defeat negligent credentialing
actions alleging improper leniency. For example, in Tennessee and Colorado, appellate courts
have decided that state peer review statutes barred claims for damages for negligent
credentialing.91
It is even arguable that the HCQIA bars every negligent credentialing action, in every
92
state. The HCQIA extends its protection to “a professional review action . . . of a professional
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review body” which meets the various requirements of the statute.93 A credentialing committee
would fit within this definition as well as a disciplinary peer review committee. The HCQIA
does have a provision stating that it shall not be “construed as affecting in any manner the rights
and remedies afforded patients under any provision of Federal or State law to seek redress for
any harm or injury suffered as a result of negligent treatment or care by any physician, health
care practitioner, or health care entity.”94 However, it is unclear whether a negligent credentialing
claim is a claim seeking redress for “any harm or injury suffered as a result of negligent
treatment or care.” Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court has suggested, in dicta, that a negligent
credentialing claim is not a claim of negligent treatment and therefore might be barred by the
HCQIA.95
Even if the federal HCQIA is not interpreted to bar negligent credentialing claims, some
state peer review statutes have been so interpreted. By removing the threat of these tort claims,
courts have removed a major incentive for hospitals to avoid improper leniency.
iii. Underreporting to the NPDB
Perhaps the most striking irony of the web of protections that surrounds the peer review
system is that it undermines the NPDB reporting system contained in the HCQIA. The NPDB
reporting system is widely viewed as deficient, with substantial and perhaps massive
underreporting of actions by hospitals against doctors affecting their clinical privileges.96 A 2009
report by Public Citizen, titled Hospitals Drop the Ball on Physician Oversight, lays out some of
the dimensions of the problem.97 Before the HCQIA took effect, it was estimated that 5,000 to
10,000 hospital adverse actions per year would be reported to the NPDB.98 However, between
the years 1990 and 2007, an average of only 650 reportable incidents were submitted per year,
and the number of adverse actions reported per year has been trending down over time.99 As of
December 31, 2007, forty-nine percent of U.S.-NPDB registered hospitals (2,845 out of 5,823)
“had never reported a clinical privilege sanction to the NPDB.”100
There are ways to get around reporting peer review actions to the NPDB. In an attempt to
understand the variation in state reporting, the Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA) funded a study in 1994 of 144 rural hospitals in the Pacific Northwest region.101 In that
study, approximately one-fifth of the hospitals increased activities that would enable them to
avoid reporting to the NPDB, such as increased monitoring without restricting clinical privileges,
requiring continuing medical education in lieu of restricting privileges, “having physicians resign
or voluntarily surrender clinical privileges . . . , and imposing disciplinary periods [of shorter]
than [thirty-one] days.”102 Of these various measures, only one formally violates the HCQIA:
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having physicians resign or voluntarily surrender clinical privileges under threat of peer review,
without reporting this action.103 However, it is a violation that is unlikely to be detected, due to
the secrecy that surrounds the peer review process.
Underreporting by hospitals to the NPDB is a problem of incentives. First, there is no
effective sanction for underreporting at the federal level. Through a laborious process, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services has the power to revoke the HCQIA immunity of
hospitals that engage in a pattern of non-reporting, but this sanction has never been imposed.104
Public Citizen urges that the HCQIA be amended to allow the imposition of civil fines for each
failure of a health care entity “to report an adverse action to the [NPDB].”105
We agree with this recommendation.106 We contend, however, that the major incentive
for underreporting is the shroud of secrecy and immunity surrounding the peer review process,
which makes it too easy for hospitals to violate their reporting obligations without detection.
Others share this concern, though they may make the point in a more understated way. For
example, in a 2006 article, Waters et al. state:
[T]he inability of regulatory authorities to police reporting permits and may even
facilitate institutional failure to report these reportable actions. Regulatory agencies
generally do not have easy access to the universe of peer review and disciplinary
actions by institutions to compare with those that are reported because such actions
are considered confidential and shielded by many state statutes. While such
restrictions are often cited as necessary to protect patient confidentiality and
practitioner reputation, they make it extremely difficult to hold institutions
accountable for meeting reporting requirements.107
In 2002, as described in the Public Citizen report, a failed study attempted to gauge
hospitals’ and HMOs’ compliance with their NPDB reporting obligations.108 Even though the
health organizations selected to participate in the study were offered amnesty for violations and
other incentives, they still refused to participate, unwilling to disclose their peer review
records.109 The study was thus abandoned.110
This abandoned study was initiated by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) on behalf of the
Health Resources and Services Administration.111 In its report, PwC recommended that “HRSA .
. . seek legislative authority and funding for conducting compliance reviews of clinical privilege
reporting, including authority to access peer review records.”112
Although we are convinced that the secrecy surrounding the peer review process is the
main impediment to fuller compliance by hospitals with their reporting obligations, this is once
again hard to prove. A great deal of useful information about NPDB reporting can be gleaned
103
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from the University of Washington (UW) study presented by Scheutzow, concerning the effect
of state laws on NPDB reporting.113 The UW study found that—controlling for various factors
that might influence reporting of adverse events to the NPDB—the strength of state immunity
and privilege statutes had an unexpected negative effect on reporting: states with stronger
protection for the peer review process had less reporting.114 Confidentiality laws, the study
found, had no effect on reporting.115
The UW study did find that the three states that imposed substantial penalties for failure
to report adverse events to the state licensing board (events that would also have to be reported to
the NPDB) had increased reporting to the NPDB.116 This finding underlines the fact that
hospitals now have insufficient incentive to report adverse events to the NPDB. As deterrence is
a function both of the strength of the penalty and the likelihood of getting caught, we believe the
finding of increased NPDB compliance in high-penalty states supports our argument that making
it harder for hospitals to hide their peer review activities would increase adverse event reporting.
The finding of increased NPDB compliance in high-penalty states also supports the proposal—
advanced by Public Citizen and other commentators—that additional non-reporting penalties,
such as fines, be added to the HCQIA.
It might be thought that our argument is undermined by the UW study’s finding that the
strength of confidentiality laws has no effect on reporting. If secrecy discourages reporting, as
we argue, would not stronger confidentiality laws actually decrease reporting? However, the
dual protection afforded to the peer review process by federal and state laws has resulted in a
level of secrecy that is universally high, regardless of state confidentiality laws. The strength of
the culture of secrecy is illustrated by the failed PwC study described above.
iv. The NPDB as a Disclosure-Based Regulatory Scheme
At its heart, the system for reporting adverse peer review actions is a disclosure-based
regulatory scheme. 117 A Harvard study examined several such disclosure systems: SEC financial
disclosure, nutrition labeling, reporting of medical mistakes, toxic release disclosure, publication
of patterns of mortgage lending, and disclosure of unions’ financial information.118 The study
found that successful schemes had three characteristics: “strong . . . intermediaries representing
information users,” a benefit to information disclosers from good disclosure, and standards that
allow information to be understood and compared.119
The NPDB reporting system may not be completely comparable to some other
disclosure-based systems, but it is still instructive to consider to what extent the current NPDB
system exhibits the characteristics of a successful disclosure-based regulatory system. We
contend that the current NPDB system falls short on all three counts. Under the current system,
there is insufficient benefit to hospitals from full disclosure because there is little prospect that a
hospital failing to make full disclosure will be penalized. Also under the current system, there are
113
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no strong intermediaries benefiting information users. The hospital controls the process, which is
secretive.
As to the comparability of information, it is ostensibly standardized: a hospital that
queries the database can tell whether a doctor has had his clinical privileges revoked, suspended
for sixty days, and so on.120 Yet, because the current system of peer review is so prone to error,
as argued above, the information is not truly comparable. Some disciplined doctors have shown
serious incompetence, while others have been the victims of “sham peer review.”121 The penalty
is comparable, but the quality of the peer review process itself is not comparable due to the
federal and state protections of the process.
In enacting the HCQIA, Congress was far more concerned with reducing improper
leniency than with reducing improper severity. The immunity in the HCQIA, and in parallel state
statutes, allows peer review bodies to impose discipline without much fear of litigation, even
though this immunity makes it easier to conduct sham peer review. The NPDB system spreads
reports of discipline nationwide, even though this reporting system magnifies the effect of sham
peer review and may drive good doctors out of the profession.
The Congressional emphasis on reducing improper leniency is evident in the
Congressional findings set forth in the HCQIA.122 Given this predominant concern with reducing
improper leniency, it might be thought—or it might once have been thought—that increasing
improper severity was a necessary price worth paying. Experience has shown, however, that the
dual federal-state system of peer review protections has not resulted in a trade-off in which
improper leniency was reduced at the cost of increasing improper severity. Rather, as we have
shown, the system tends to increase both kinds of errors: improper leniency as well as improper
severity.
We earlier listed the three assumptions underlying the practice of traditional disciplinary
peer review, according to Moore et al.123 The third assumption is that “peer review participants are
motivated to maintain high standards of care in their group or institution and act in good faith.”124
Experience has shown that this assumption, in particular, is naive. Doubtless peer reviewers often
have noble motivations and often act in good faith, but they also often have self-interested
motivations disposing them toward improper severity or improper leniency: motivations that are
magnified, rather than inhibited, by the current regulatory scheme.
IV.

OPENING UP THE SYSTEM

Our proposed solution to the problems of hospital peer review is to open up the system:
to eliminate completely all immunity, privilege, and confidentiality under federal and state law.
We realize how radical this proposal is.125 It is an idealized vision, not a proposal that we
necessarily expect to be adopted any time in the near future.
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The elimination of privilege, immunity and confidentiality would mean that hospitals
(and peer reviewers, internal and external) could be sued by doctors alleging sham peer review.
Hospitals could be sued by patients who allege negligence in credentialing and in allowing
doctors to retain clinical privileges. Medical malpractice plaintiffs having a claim against a
doctor could monitor any disciplinary peer review of the doctor’s behavior and could use
information thus obtained in their cases.126 Instead of being insulated from liability on all sides,
the peer review process would be open to challenge from all interested parties and open to
examination by those parties. Opening up the process in this way should reduce both kinds of
errors to which the current system is subject: improper severity and improper leniency.
Scheutzow would remove immunity on one side of the process, but not on the other.127
She urges states to allow negligent credentialing suits and Congress to “take steps to ensure that
the [HCQIA] cannot be interpreted to provide immunity for negligent credentialing matters.”128
But having protected the right to sue for negligent credentialing, Scheutzow would retain
“immunity from lawsuits brought by those physicians adversely affected by the process.”129
We disagree: all immunities related to the peer review process must be eliminated. If
hospitals are subject to liability for improper leniency (through negligent credentialing suits) but
not for improper severity, their incentives will be tilted even more strongly toward improper
severity. Opening up the process to claims from both doctors and injured patients will encourage
peer review decisions that are properly balanced and correct: neither improperly lenient nor
improperly severe.
A.

Peer Review Not Discouraged

We now examine in detail the likely effects of our radical proposal and respond to a
number of objections. An obvious objection is that opening up the system will discourage peer
review. This objection must be clarified, however: discourage peer review in place of what?
There are two basic ways in which hospitals might reduce the practice of peer review, and each
requires a somewhat different analysis. First, hospitals could forego any discipline of doctors,
allowing them to retain clinical privileges even in the face of clear misconduct. Second, hospitals
could deprive doctors of clinical privileges, but without conducting peer review.
The unduly permissive practice of allowing doctors to retain privileges without going
through peer review, even after they endanger patient health, is one that exists now for doctors
who receive favoritism from their hospitals and colleagues. 130 This permissiveness will most
likely decrease once the system is opened up. Injured patients will demand peer review and will
be able to verify whether it is taking place. Hospitals will face the possibility that, if they
improperly fail to conduct peer review, future patients who are injured by a doctor will sue the
hospital for negligently allowing the doctor to remain credentialed.
True, the hospital will also lose its immunity to suits by doctors who claim they have
been wrongly deprived of their clinical privileges. But the balance of incentives should still lead
hospitals to conduct peer review when it is warranted. The prospect of a strong negligent
credentialing suit by a future patient, with its attendant negative publicity, should outweigh the
126
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prospect of a weak suit by a doctor who really does deserve to lose his privileges. Conversely, if
peer review is not warranted, or discipline after peer review is not warranted, the balance of
incentives in an open system should lead hospitals not to deprive doctors of their clinical
privileges: the prospect of a strong suit by the doctor (no longer barred by immunity) should
outweigh the prospect of a weak negligent credentialing suit by a future patient.
The other way in which hospitals might reduce the practice of peer review under an open
system is by depriving doctors of clinical privileges without peer review. This also happens
under the current system, and results in underreporting to the NPDB.131
Hospitals can coerce doctors into surrendering their privileges under threat of sham peer
review, then fail to report this action to the NPDB, even though by law such a surrender of
privileges under threat of peer review must be reported.132
Once again, however, such practices would be less likely under an open system. Without
the immunity that often protects sham peer review, doctors will not be so easily cowed into
surrendering their privileges; they will demand peer review. In short, we are not convinced by
the objection that an open system will lead hospitals to reduce the use of peer review, either by
allowing doctors to retain privileges without going through peer review or by depriving them of
privileges without peer review.
B.

Increased Use of External Reviewers

Most peer review proceedings involve internal review: the physician is judged by
colleagues who are affiliated with the same hospital.133 As argued above, conflicts of interest are
inherent in such a process. The use of external reviewers would greatly alleviate these
conflicts.134
Opening up the system as we propose would encourage hospitals to use external
reviewers in the peer review process. If a hospital is sued because of its peer review results,
whether by a doctor or a patient, its defense will be significantly more credible if it can show that
it followed the decision of external reviewers. Following the decision of external reviewers
would certainly tend to negate the inference of improper bias, either for or against the doctor
being reviewed. Once the peer review system loses its shield of immunity, hospitals will more
often decide that they need the greater credibility of external review.
An increased use of external reviewers would likely improve the quality of peer review
not only because of the avoidance of bias, but because external reviewers will be compensated at
market rates. Internal peer reviewers are generally uncompensated; peer review is a duty they
must fulfill in order to maintain staff privilege at the hospital.135 Of course, a process in which
individuals are compelled to donate their time is likely to be short-changed on time and effort.
Ironically, many physicians who act as internal reviewers without compensation are able
to earn hundreds of dollars per hour for performing a similar function: providing reviews as
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expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases.136 Quality of care would be served by spending
some of this money up front while the case is being reviewed in a medical context—before it
gets to a courtroom.
Hopefully, the removal of immunity, privilege, and confidentiality would lead eventually
to the creation of a cadre of professional, compensated, and specifically trained and credentialed
peer reviewers. If there were an accrediting organization for peer reviewers, it would probably be
best for that organization to select the external reviewers for each case, rather than leaving that
function in the hands of the hospital. External selection of the external reviewers would further
minimize the ability of hospitals to manipulate the results of the review process.137
C. Effect on Internal Reviewers
A major justification given for peer review immunity in the existing system is that
internal reviewers would not participate if they risked getting sued.138 Opening up the system, as
we propose, would admittedly discourage internal reviewers from participating. That, however,
is not a telling objection to our proposal; rather, it is an advantage. Our proposal would move
toward a system in which the external reviewer is more common and the internal reviewer is
rarer; we would not be disappointed if the internal reviewer disappeared entirely.
Nevertheless, even if all our proposals were adopted, hospitals would likely still continue
to use at least some internal reviewers; after all, internal reviewers were used before all the
immunities and other peer review protections that now exist were written into federal and state
law. Hospitals would likely address the internal reviewers’ fear of liability by providing them
with insurance from an insurance company or by having the hospital itself agree to defend and
indemnify them against resulting litigation. Even with insurance, the removal of immunity
should have a salutary effect on the way internal reviewers perform their function, giving them
greater incentives to avoid both improper severity and improper leniency.
D. Effect on NPDB Underreporting
Opening up the peer review system would likely reduce NPDB underreporting to a
considerable degree. With peer review proceedings public, it will be much harder to hide adverse
actions that should be reported to the NPDB. 139 Hospitals will be wary of evading NPDB
reporting by imposing too minimal sanctions (such as educational requirements or a suspension
of less than thirty days), for fear of provoking negligent credentialing suits. And we have already
noted that hospitals will be less able to coerce doctors to surrender their privileges by threatening
peer review; if the doctor believes he deserves to retain his clinical privileges, he will be more
likely to have faith in the peer review process and to demand that the process be followed.
But we have an additional proposal that should promote accurate NPDB reporting to an
even greater extent. If there is a failure in NPDB reporting at one hospital that leads to a doctor
gaining clinical privileges at a second hospital and then injuring a patient through malpractice,
136
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the injured patient should have a cause of action against the first hospital as well as any other
appropriate defendants. Enforcing the NPDB reporting obligations through a private right of
action should magnify the incentive of hospitals to comply fully with those obligations.
As we earlier observed, the NPDB system can be seen as a disclosure-based regulatory
system.140 Research has shown that such a regulatory system, if successful, has three
characteristics: strong intermediaries representing information users, a benefit to information
disclosers from good disclosure, and standards that allow information to be understood and
compared. The current peer review system does not display these characteristics, but our
proposals would go far to remedy its defects.
To repeat, under the current system, there is insufficient benefit to hospitals from full
disclosure because there is little prospect that a hospital failing to make full disclosure will be
penalized. Also under the current system, there are no strong intermediaries benefiting
information users. The hospital controls the process, which is secret. The penalties reported to
the NPDB are ostensibly comparable, but the peer review proceedings resulting in those
penalties are not comparable: no one can tell whether the doctor was justifiably disciplined or
was the victim of a sham peer review.
Under our proposed reforms, by contrast, the NPDB reporting system would have the
characteristics of a successful disclosure-based regulatory scheme. Hospitals would have greater
incentive to comply fully with their NPDB reporting obligations because it would be much
harder for them to conceal actions that they are obliged to report. As noted above, in addition to
opening up the peer review system, we support making additional sanctions available for nonreporting, such as civil fines, and we support the creation of a new private right of action against
hospitals that violate their NPDB reporting obligations. These reforms would give hospitals even
greater incentives to comply with their NPDB reporting obligations.
An open peer review system would have a variety of strong intermediaries promoting full
NPDB reporting. These would include external reviewers, who would not want to be associated
with deficient peer review systems, and medical malpractice plaintiffs and their attorneys, who
would focus public attention on allegations of serious medical incompetence being heard by the
peer review system. If our proposal for a private right of action against hospitals violating their
NPDB reporting obligations were adopted, additional strong intermediaries promoting disclosure
would be added.
An open and public peer review system would also produce results that are comparable.
The methodology and format of the most credible reviews would be expected to become
standard.
There has always been something paradoxical about the attempt to create a transparent
and public database of physician discipline by channeling into it reports from an impenetrably
secret and virtually unchallengeable closed peer review system. There is certainly no guarantee
that an open system will improve NPDB reporting, but that result seems very likely to us.
E.

Problems of Cost

Our proposals would add a number of visible costs to the peer review system. At least
initially, litigation that is now barred or discouraged by peer review protections would likely
increase. More doctors would challenge the results of an adverse peer review, more patients
would sue hospitals for negligent credentialing, and more patients would bring malpractice cases
based on information obtained from a public peer review process.
140
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The peer review process itself would also become more expensive for hospitals. They
would substantially increase the number of external reviewers they use, and each external
reviewer would probably receive a higher fee, reflecting the increased risk of being sued and the
increased cost of insurance to the external reviewer. The cost of insuring and/or indemnifying
internal reviewers would also rise, and hospitals might even find themselves compensating
internal reviewers for their time. Arguably, all of these additional costs of an open peer review
system could cause some rise in the cost of health care.
Despite the increased visible costs of an open system, we contend that improving the
results of peer review, through our proposals, would improve the quality of care and would
reduce social costs overall. “Sham” peer review would no longer drive good doctors out of the
profession at great social cost. Nor would “sham” peer review deter legitimate criticism and
“whistleblowing” by doctors, as it does now. Bad practices and bad doctors would be caught
more quickly in an open system that is subject to challenge by all interested parties, reducing
great damage that would otherwise be done. In short, liability exposure to all interested parties
would cause the quality of care to improve. With improved quality, the malpractice costs of
hospitals and doctors could actually decline over time.
Even in the short term, opening up the peer review system to challenge from all sides
may not produce a litigation explosion. The immediate improvement in the peer review process,
due to increased use of external reviewers and loss of immunity, should limit the number of
cases brought by doctors alleging “sham” or bad-faith peer review. As to malpractice cases,
when peer review finds a culpable error, plaintiffs will certainly be eager to use that ammunition
in their court cases. Often, however, peer review will not find that the doctor is at fault. In such
cases, the enhanced credibility of the peer review process may discourage litigants from bringing
a malpractice case.
Moreover, a significant percentage of malpractice claims are brought by patients because
they feel that the hospital or physicians are hiding something.141 Although it is conceded that in
many of these cases facts may actually be hidden, in many other cases they are not. Publicly
accessible peer review records would go a long way toward reassuring patients and their families
that they have all the facts.142
V.

CONCLUSION

The well-intended immunity from civil liability for peer review established by the
HCQIA, along with state immunity, privilege, and confidentiality, have the paradoxical effect of
shielding hospital quality improvement processes from outside scrutiny and discouraging
mandated reporting of adverse actions against hospital physicians. These legal protections should
be removed. The resulting market forces can be expected to create a more credible and robust
peer review process that will result in improved hospital quality and reporting. It is both ironic
and unsettling that the court system—with its use of discovery available to all parties, and
compensated medical experts that practice in the same field as the care provider—creates a more
141

See, e.g., Kathleen Shostek & Christine Clark, Communication Plays Key Role in OB Patient Expectations, J.
HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT., Autumn (Fall) 2008, at 29, 29; Richard A. Spector, Plaintiff’s Attorneys Share
Perspectives on Patient Communication, 29 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT., no. 3, 2010, at 29, 30.
142
One study has shown that lawsuits and legal costs decrease when disclosure programs are implemented. See
Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation of a Medical Error Disclosure
Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 217 (2010) (finding that disclosure-and-offer program reduced
frequency of lawsuits and liability costs at the University of Michigan Health System).
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credible peer review product than the health care industry. We contend that it would be better for
this level of effort to occur first as a hospital activity rather in the courts. Repeal of peer review
immunity, privilege, and confidentiality is a large and necessary first step.
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Summary of State Peer Review Protections
State

Immunity

Privilege

Confidentiality

Alabama

ALA. CODE § 34-24-58 (2013);
see also ALA. CODE § 6
6-5-333(A) (2013).

ALA. CODE § 34-24-60 (2013);
see also ALA. CODE §
6-5-333(D) (2013).

See Privilege.

Alaska

ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§
18.23.010, 18.23.020 (West
2013).

ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
18.23.030 (West 2013).

See Privilege.

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36445.02 (2013).

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36445.01 (2013).

See Privilege.

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-502
(West 2013).

ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9503(a) (West 2013).

None.

California

None.

CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157
(West 2013).

None.

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 1236.5-105 (West 2013); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3109(6) (West 2013).

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 25-3- COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
109(4) (West 2013).
25-3-109(1) (West 2013).

Connecticut

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-17b(b) (West 2013).

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a117b(d) (West 2013).
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CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-17c (West 2013).

Comments

California opted out of the peer review
provisions of the HCQIA but not the
reporting requirements to the NPDB. CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE §
809 (West 2013).
“[I]mplementation of quality management
functions to evaluate and improve patient
and resident care is essential . . . [so it] is
necessary that the collection of information
and data by such licensed or certified health
care facilities be reasonably unfettered.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
25-3-109 (West 2013).
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Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
1768(A) (West 2013).

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
1768(B) (West 2013).

See Privilege.

Washington, D.C.

D.C. CODE § 44-803
(2013).

D.C. CODE § 44-805
(2013).

See Privilege.

Florida

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0193(5)
(West 2013).

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0193(8)
(West 2013).

None.

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-132 (West GA. CODE ANN.. § 31-7-133 (West See Privilege.
2013).
2013).

Hawaii

HAW. REV. STAT. §6331.7 (2013). HAW. REV. STAT. §624-25.5
(2013).

See Privilege.

Idaho

IDAHO CODE § 39-1392c
(West 2013).

IDAHO CODE § 39-1392b (West
2013).

See Privilege.

Illinois

225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/5
(2013).

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2101
(2013); see also 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/8-2102 (2013).

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2101 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2105 (2013).
(2013).
(Improper disclosure is a misdemeanor)

Indiana

IND. CODE §§ 34-30-1515–20 (2013).

IND. CODE § 34-30-15-1 (2013).

IND. CODE § 34-30-15-8
(2013).

Iowa

IOWA CODE § 147.135(1)
(2013).

IOWA CODE § 147.135 (2) (2013). See Privilege.

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN. §65-4909
(2013).

KAN. STAT. ANN. §65-4915(B)
(2013).

See Privilege.

Such goals may be achieved by requiring a
system which combines a reasonable means
to monitor the quality of health care with
the provision of a reasonable means to
compensate patients for the risks related to
receiving health care rendered by
healthcare providers licensed by the state of
Kansas. Kan. Stat. Ann. §65-4914 (West).
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Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.377(1) (2013).

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.377(2) (2013).

See Privilege.

Louisiana

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3715.3(B)–(C) (2013).

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:3715.3(A) (2013).

See Privilege.

Maine

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
§ 2511 (West 2013); ME. REV.
2599 (West 2013).
STAT. tit. 32, § 3293 (West 2013).

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§§
2510, 2510-A (West
2013).

Maryland

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC.
1-401(f) (West 2013).
§ 1-4001(d) (West 2013).

See Privilege.

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231, § 85N (West 2013).

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
111, § 204 (West 2013).

See Privilege.

Michigan

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
331.351 (West 2013).

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§331.533 (West 2013).

See Privilege.

Minnesota

MINN. STAT. §§ 145.62–63
(2013).

MINN. STAT. § 145.64(1)
(2013).

See Privilege.

Penalty for disclosure is a misdemeanor.
MINN. STAT. § 145.66 (2013).

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-63-5
(West 2013).

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-63-9
(West 2013).

See Privilege.

“[E]xpressed legislative purpose of
promoting quality patient care through
medical and dental peer review activities.”
MISS. CODE ANN. §
41-63-9 (West 2013).

Missouri

MO. REV. STAT. § 537.035
(3) (2013).

MO. REV. STAT. § 537.035
(4) (2013).

None.
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anyone who applies for/is granted
privileges waives any claim to damages that
may result from peer review.
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Montana

MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2201(1) (2013).

MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2201(2) (2013).

None.

Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT. §71-7911
(2013).

NEB. REV. STAT. §71-7912
(2013).

See Privilege.

Nevada

None.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.265
(2013).

None.

New Hampshire

None.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
151:13-a (2013).

See Privilege.

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A22.10 (West 2013).

None.

None.

New Mexico

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-9-3–4
(West 2013).

N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-9-5
(West 2013).

See Privilege.

New York

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2805-m (3) (McKinney
2013).

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2805-m(2) (McKinney
2013).

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2805-m(1) (McKinney
2013).

North Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
131E-95(a) (West 2013).

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
131E-95(b) (West 2013).

See Privilege.

Nebraska changed its peer review laws in
2011. The new statute is more restrictive in
that the grant of confidentiality and
privilege of the peer review records is
absolute. By comparison, the old statute
allowed for the veil of privilege to be
pierced if the patient waived confidentiality

Unauthorized disclosure is a “petty
misdemeanor and shall be punished by
imprisonment for not to exceed six months
or by a fine of not more than one hundred
dollars ($100), or both.” N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-9-6 (West 2013).
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North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-3406 (West 2013).

N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-03
(West 2013).

N.D. CENT. CODE § 2334-02 (West 2013).

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.251 (West 2013).

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.252 (West 2013).

See Privilege.

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§
25–26 (West 2013).

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 11709.1 (West 2013).

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
1-1709.1 (West 2013).

Oregon

None.

OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055
(West 2013) (all data is privileged
pursuant to OR. REV. STAT. §
41.675 (West
2013)).

OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055
(West 2013) (pursuant to OR.
REV. STAT.
§§192.501–192.505,
192.690 (West 2013)).

Pennsylvania

63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 425.3 (West 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 425.4 (West See Privilege.
2013).
2013).

Rhode Island

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-25
(West 2013); see also R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-37.3-7 (West
2013).

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-25
(West 2013).

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.37 (West 2013).

South Carolina

S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-70-10
(2013).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-425 (2013).

S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20
(2013).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-426.1 (2013).

See Privilege.

South Dakota
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to civil and criminal (misdemeanor)
liability. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-9 (West
2013).
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Tennessee

TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11272(d) (West 2013).

TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11272(c) (West 2013).

See Privilege.

Texas

TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§
160.010 (West 2013).

TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§
160.006; 160.007 (West
2013).

See Privilege.

Utah

UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-13-5
(West 2013).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1442
(West 2013).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.16 (West 2013).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.250 (West 2013).

None.

None

West Virginia

W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-2
(2013).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-25-3
(West 2013).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1443
(West 2013).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.17 (West 2013).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
4.24.250, 70.41.200 (West
2013).
W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3
(2013).

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. ANN. §146.37
(2013).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-17103 (West 2013); see also id.
§ 33-26-408.

WIS. STAT. ANN. §146.38
(2013).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-17-105
(West 2013); see also id. §
33-26-408.

Vermont
Virginia
Washington

Wyoming

“It is the policy of this state to encourage
the improvement of patient safety, the
quality of patient care and the evaluation of
the quality, safety, cost, processes and
necessity of healthcare services by
hospitals, healthcare facilities and
healthcare providers. Tennessee further
recognizes that certain protections must be
available to these entities to ensure that they
are able to effectively pursue these
measures. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-272
(West 2013).

See Privilege.
None.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
70.56.050 (West 2013).
See Privilege.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-26408 (West 2013)
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